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Abstract 
This paper describes some of the challenges to successful institutionalization of 
environmental dispute resolution approaches by large public resource agencies such as 
the U.S. Forest Service. Based on the results of a study of four national forests that 
utilized environmental dispute resolution approaches to resolve forest plan appeals, the 
paper discusses the importance of (1) effective boundary-spanning, (2) diffusion of 
knowledge about environmental dispute resolution within the organization, and (3) 
reconciling differential organizational and individual perspectives and costs through 
formal organizational change. 
Introduction 
In the last fifteen to twenty years, scores of seemingly intractable environmental 
disputes have been successfully resolved through ad hoc environmental dispute resolution 
approaches (Bingham 1986). Environmental dispute resolution (EDR) refers collectively to a 
variety of dispute resolution processes that go by various labels including collaborative 
problem-solving, negotiation and mediation. Bingham (1986, 5) defines EDR as, 
. . . a variety of approaches that allow the parties to meet face to face in an 
effort to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues in a dispute or 
potentially controversial situation . . . all are voluntary processes that involve 
some form of consensus building, joint problem solving, or negotiation.' 
'For simplicity, the terms "environmental dispute resolution" and "negotiation" are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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The apparent success of environmental dispute resolution approaches has attracted the 
attention of state and federal resource agencies as well as corporations and citizen 
organizations (Carpenter and Kennedy 1979; Crowfoot 1980; Susskind and Ozawa 1983). 
For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Forest Service all have utilized 
consensus-building processes in recent years (Fiorino and Kirtz 1985; Susskind, Podziba and 
Babbitt 1989; Floyd and Mealey 1989; Wondolleck 1988). This interest in EDR is fueled by 
frustration with the costs and limitations of traditional adversarial, often judicially-based 
methods of resolving controversial environmental problems. 
As the number of ad hoc success stories continues to grow, attention is being directed 
to institutionalizing EDR approaches within public resource agencies at the state and federal 
levels. Institutionalization refers to a variety of ways to incorporate EDR within 
organizational procedures as a routine decision-making tool. It is important to note that 
institutionalization needs to be understood as a complex, multidimensional process. It 
involves the trial, regularization and formalization of new individual attitudes and skills, new 
forms of existing relationships or entirely new relationships, and organizational mechanisms 
for implementing new conflict management methods and agreements (Manring 1987). In 
other words, institutionalization of EDR involves change at both the individual and 
organizational levels. 
2This paper is based on the theoretical foundation developed in a previous work by 
Manring that examines the nature and dynamics of institutionalization of alternative conflict 
management approaches. Interested readers may want to refer to the first work entitled 
"Institutionalizing Conflict Management Alternatives" (Center for Research on Social 
Organization, Program on Conflict Management Alternatives, Working Paper No. 7. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1987.) 
The U.S. Forest Service is one of the federal agencies that has experimented with 
EDR on an ad hoc basis for a number of years. For example, in 1982, controversy 
surrounding several timber sales in Oregon's Willamette National Forest was resolved 
through the use of a consensus dialogue process (Wondolleck 1985). In 1983, a dispute over 
proposed road building and logging in Colorado's San Juan National Forest was resolved 
with the assistance of environmental mediators (Tableman 1990). As early as 1986, ten 
appeals of forest plans had been resolved successfully through negotiation (Wondolleck 
1986). 
More recently the Forest Service has taken an important first step to institutionalize 
EDR within agency decision-making. Faced with an ever increasing number of 
administrative appeals of forest plans as well as appeals of timber sales, oil and gas leases, 
and grazing permits, in 1988, the agency revised its administrative appeal regulation to 
explicitly authorize negotiations between Forest Service officials and  appellant^.^ In. other 
words, the agency has taken a first step toward the formal institutionalization of EDR by 
authorizing and encouraging the use of EDR in codified regulation. The Forest Service is 
one of the first federal agencies to try to institutionalize EDR on an organization-wide basis. 
Thus, it provides an early case study of the challenges associated with organizational 
institutionalization of EDR. 
336 CFR Part 217.12. Resolution of Issues. 
(a) When a decision is appealed, the Deciding Officer may discuss the appeal with the 
appellant(s) and intervenor(s) together or separately to narrow issues, agree on facts, and 
explore opportunities to resolve the issues by means other than review and decision on the 
appeal . . . Reviewing Officers may at the request of the Deciding Officer's, or on their own 
initiative, extend the time periods for review and specify a reasonable duration to allow for 
conduct of meaningful negotiations. (Federal Register 54(13) January 23, 1989, p. 3361.) 
It is important to monitor these first efforts to institutionalize EDR for a variety of 
reasons. Proponents of institutionalizing EDR will want to learn from the successes and 
mistakes of these first attempts to change EDR's status from a tool for occasional, ad hoc 
dispute resolution to a regularized way of conducting agency business. Critics of 
institutionalization will want to see if institutionalized EDR retains the strengths and 
advantages attributed to the informality and voluntarism of "ad hocracy" when it is converted 
to a more formalized and perhaps mandatory means of resolving environmental disputes. 
The significance of the Forest Service's first, formalized step to institutionalize EDR 
should not be underestimated. However, it is important to recognize that authorizing the use 
of EDR through codified regulation is just a first step. As noted above, institutionalization 
involves change at both the organizational and individual levels. Although the organization 
can formally endorse the use of EDR, the ultimate success. of this initiative will depend upon 
several factors. Individual organizational members must develop the requisite skills, be 
willing to actually use EDR, and be willing and able to implement the resulting negotiated 
agreements. Second, it is likely that organizational changes will be required in order to 
accommodate and support this conflict management innovation. In other words, it is 
important to understand the nature of key challenges that could affect the successful 
implementation of this conflict management initiative. The rest of this paper examines key 
factors associated with successful institutionalization including (1) effective boundary- 
spanning, (2) diffusion of knowledge about EDR within the organization, and (3) reconciling 
differential organizational and individual perspectives and costs through formal organizational 
change. 
The Role of Boundarv-Spanning 
Evidence suggests that monitoring the organizational environment through effective 
boundary-spanning (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967) is necessary for the 
successful institutionalization of EDR. Boundary-spanning can enable agency officials to 
better understand their organizational environment and their realistic alternatives to 
negotiations. In other words, knowledgeable appraisal of the organizational environment is 
necessary in order for organizational members to see the benefits of EDR. Conversely, 
ignorance of the agency's actual sociopolitical environment and correspondingly distorted 
impressions of the agency's decision-making autonomy can inhibit the realistic appraisal of 
conflict management alternatives. If agency officials do not understand their reasonable 
alternatives to negotiation, they may reject conflict management tools that can benefit the 
agency as a whole as well as individual land managers. 
Whether Forest Service officials in the sample described EDR in positive or negative 
terms was heavily influenced by whether they understood and accepted the current 
sociopolitical context of forest management. The Forest Service historically has had a high 
degree of organizational autonomy and independence that is prized by the agency (Clarke and 
McCool 1985; Robinson 1975). However, the traditional autonomy of the Forest Service has 
been threatened in recent years. Both the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
U.S.C. 4321 (note)) and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1600 
(note)) (NFMA) substantially increased the involvement of the public as well as other 
government agencies in forest planning (Wilkinson and Anderson 1985): NFMA in particular 
represents unprecedented Congressional involvement in forest planning and management, and 
constituency dependence increasingly is necessary to accomplish broad organizational goals 
(Selznick 1953; West 1982). In other words, the prescriptive nature of NFMA coupled with 
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greatly expanded public involvement in forest planning has eroded the agency's traditional, 
near unfettered autonomy. 
Forest Service officials in the sample recognized that given the current sociopolitical 
context of forest management, EDR is a tool that can protect the agency's -- and individuals' 
-- professional autonomy. For example, as one forest level official noted, 
I'd prefer to operate with negotiation where I still make decisions. I may not 
have the broad scope of decision-making authority that I possibly once had; it 
may be somewhat restricted. But I'd rather be in that situation than have all 
my decisions made for me by Congress. 
Successfully negotiating forest plan appeals protects organizational autonomy by enabling the 
Forest Service to maintain its jurisdiction over issues. Negotiating appeals enables the 
agency to contain conflict at lower levels in the agency, and minimizes the risk of judicial or 
legislative intervention. In other words, when agency officials are able to negotiate forest 
plan appeals, they are able to retain control over decision-making .: 
Negotiating appeals also enhances autonomy by enabling Forest Service officials to 
build the public support so critical in this current era of constituency dependence. The 
professional autonomy of individual Forest Service managers often is constrained by conflict 
and lack of public consent that can thwart the implementation of plans. Negotiating appeals 
and gaining acceptance and support for Forest Service programs can enable agency officials 
to resume management activities that may have been thwarted by unresolved conflict and 
appeals. While appeals are pending, Forest Service managers may be constrained from using 
certain management practices in particular areas of the forest. For example, clear-cutting 
operations may have to be suspended in order to avoid adding further fuel to the controversy; 
in some cases, agency officials may be enjoined by court order from using certain practices 
such as chemical brush control. However, negotiating appeals builds public consent that 
enhances Forest Service officials' autonomy by allowing plan implementation to proceed. As 
one regional forester noted, "Through conflict resolution, you can get out there and really 
manage. " 
Thus, successful institutionalization of EDR requires that organizational members 
interact with and understand the realities of their organizational environment in order to 
realistically evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of EDR. Without this critical 
awareness, organizational members may naively reject valuable conflict management tools. 
One of the advantages of EDR is that the EDR process itself can function as a 
boundary-spanning mechanism. Members of organizations typically look at the 
organizational environment through the lens of organizational ideology, tradition and culture 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Schiff 1966; Twight 1983); in fact, to a certain degree, 
organizational environments are created by the organizational members themselves through 
'selective attention and interpretation (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The pervasiveness of the 
organizational culture and ideology can make it difficult for organizational members to 
accurately read their organizational environment. 
However, the structure of most EDR approaches helps to mitigate the selective 
perception that can distort impressions of the organizational environment. The face-to-face 
nature of EDR processes makes it more difficult for organizational members to interpret their 
environment according to organizational constructions of reality. The direct and often 
lengthy, face-to-face dialogue with forest users in the EDR processes enabled agency officials 
to better understand the realities of their organizational environment. Forest Service officials 
learned a great deal about the appellants during the negotiation process; they gained 
information and insights via EDR processes that had not been accessible to them through 
more traditional means of public involvement. In negotiations, Forest Service officials 
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developed a better understanding of the changing values of the public and identified issues of 
which they were previously unaware. For example, one forest official explained this critical 
boundary-spanning function of EDR as follows: 
It gives us a better appreciation of the people, and it helps us . . . adapt and 
make the changes that we need to make . . . The conflict resolution is a real 
opportunity for us to keep in touch with the change that is needed. 
The EDR process also can enable agency officials to better communicate the agency's 
needs. In other words, boundary-spanning in an EDR process is a two-way street; not only 
does the agency take in vital information, but agency officials also can use the EDR process 
to communicate organizational needs. For example, one forest official described this 
boundary-spanning function of EDR processes as follows: 
The advantage to the agency is that those are private citizens (i.e, the 
appellants) who are part of the constituency of the Congressional delegation . . 
. We're prohibited by law to lobby; we're just informing people of our needs. 
The important implication for institutionalization of EDR is that boundary-spanning is 
a dynamic process that can reinforce the benefits of EDR. Effective boundary-spanning can 
provide vital insights that enable agency officials to realistically evaluate the potential 
advantages of engaging in EDR processes. Once involved in an EDR process, agency 
officials take in important information about their publics and are able to convey 
organizational needs; thus, the utility of EDR is reinforced. However, the key challenge is 
to set the process in motion initially through realistic, knowledgeable reading of the 
organizational environment. 
Diffusion of Knowledge About EDR 
Another challenge for successful institutionalization of EDR can be the difficulty of 
diffusing knowledge of EDR within the agency. It was difficult for the Forest Service to 
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internally advertise its successes in EDR for fear of biasing the willingness of appellants to 
engage in negotiations. In 1986, the agency conducted its own internal analysis of the 
outcomes of twenty appeals from five forests. Their internal analysis showed that the Forest 
Service was "winning" in negotiations. However, agency officials feared that written reports 
of how they were "winning" in negotiations would jeopardize the "win-win" image of 
consensus processes and discourage appellants from participating in future negotiations. For 
example, as an official in the Washington Office explained, 
. . . we want to convey we haven't given up much in negotiation . . . but this 
doesn't sell well with the public. Probably one reason why publicity of 
negotiation is minimal is because the agency feels it hasn't given up much. 
Although it may be in the strategic interest of the agency not to advertise their 
successes in negotiations in order to protect their position in future negotiations, lack of 
attention to their successes deters diffusion within the agency. Thus, a challenge to 
successful institutionalization of EDR involves balancing strategic concerns with the need to 
disseminate the agency's successes with EDR in order to dispel fears and generate wider 
commitment and support from organizational members. Organizational mechanisms need to 
be devised to facilitate the sharing of success stories with EDR as well as thoughtful 
discussions of the disadvantages of EDR. It is likely that federal agencies such as the Forest 
Service that operate within the constraints posed by the Freedom of Information Act (P.L. 
93-502,88 Stat. 1561, as amended; 5 U.S.C. 552) may choose to rely heavily upon informal, 
verbal sharing of successes in order to not jeopardize the organization's strategic position in 
future  negotiation^.^ In addition, agency officials need access to detailed case studies that 
illustrate what the agency has been able to accomplish by using EDR processes.' 
Perhaps equally as difficult for the diffusion of knowledge about EDR within the 
agency is the difficulty of replacing experiential learning. The overall impression from 
Forest Service officials in the sample suggests that individuals need to experience EDR 
processes first-hand. Several individuals talked about their first experiences in EDR 
processes in terms that suggested it had been a powerful, transforming experience. For 
example, one forest official referred to his involvement as a "dramatic human event" that 
changed his values, outlook and management style. Likewise, another agency official 
described his involvement in the EDR process as a "very profound learning experience." 
It is difficult to achieve this kind of profound learning through anything other than 
direct experience. However, an organization may be able to capitalize on the loyalty of its 
members by emphasizing the organizational advantages of EDR approaches in order to 
encourage the use of EDR by individual organizational members. For example, Forest 
Service officials appear to have a strong sense of identification with the interests and needs of 
the organization; the loyalty and esprit d'corps of organizational members has long been 
observed (Kaufman 1960). Thus, understanding of the organizational advantages of EDR 
such as protecting organizational autonomy may help individual agency officials overcome 
their reluctance to try EDR approaches. 
4This recommendation does not address the issue of whether it is appropriate for a 
federal agency to withhold information that shows whose interests are being served by one of 
its decision-making processes. 
'This recommendation does not address the important issue of what "winning" means to 
the appellants and whether the EDR processes employed by the Forest Service are in fact 
"win-win". 
Reconciling Differential Organizational and 
Individual Perspectives and Costs 
Finally, reconciling the organizational and individual perspectives are critical in order 
to successfully institutionalize EDR approaches. Although the organization as a whole can 
formally adopt and endorse EDR through codified regulation, individuals are responsible for 
actually utilizing EDR approaches and implementing resulting agreements. Interpretations of 
the advantages and disadvantages of EDR are influenced by whether one speaks from the 
perspective of the organization as a whole or from the vantage point of individual 
organizational members. 
One of the most critical organizationallindividual dualities involves the differential 
costs of EDR approaches. Perceptions of the costs of EDR are influenced by whether one 
looks from the perspective of the organization as a whole or from the perspective of 
individual organizational members. Moreover, the costs of EDR are not borne equally by 
individuals at all levels in the agency. In particular, lower level line officers and staff who 
actively participated in EDR processes bear the brunt of the time .demands of EDR.6 
Although the revision of the appeal regulation occurred after an agency-wide review, 
the formalization of the authority to negotiate appeals was largely motivated by concerns 
emanating from the Washington Office of the Forest Service; delegating conflict management 
activities to lower levels of the agency hopefully would remove the burden on the 
Washington Office staff who were grappling with a growing backlog of unresolved appeals. 
6The Forest Service, like many federal resource agencies, is a decentralized bureaucracy. 
Top level officials and policy makers work in the agency's Washington office. The country 
is then subdivided into nine Forest Service regions, each directed by a regional forester. The 
regions are further subdivided into national forests, headed by a forest supervisor; the forests 
are subdivided into ranger districts, headed by a district ranger. EDR processes typically 
involve primarily forest and district level officials who are aided by key officials from their 
corresponding regional office. 
It was assumed that delegating conflict management activities would eliminate delays in 
appeal processing and save time for the organization as a whole in terms of calendar days.7 
However, for individuals, participation in EDR processes requires a great deal of time 
in terms of manhours. Forest Service officials in the sample reported that in terms of 
manhours, negotiating appeals demanded much more time from individuals. In other words, 
the EDR processes saved time for the agency as a whole in terms of calendar days, but took 
more time in terms of manhours for the involved agency officials. For example, as one 
forest official noted, "It (negotiation) does require a lot more of our time on the ground and 
at the forest level. But if we are successful, we can save time and money for the agency as a 
whole. " 
At the time of this research effort, it appeared that top level policy-makers in the 
agency did not fully understand the new demands that were being thrust upon lower level line. 
officers and their staffs. Perhaps more importantly, whether or not the Washington Office 
understood the demands of EDR, organizational mechanisms were not yet in place to 
mitigate the differential effects. A growing number of agency officials have tried to 
incorporate EDR approaches into their decision-making even without significant changes in 
organizational policy and workload to facilitate this newer management style. However, it is 
important to question how long agency officials would continue to utilize EDR without 
changes in organizational policies and reward systems to mitigate the differential effects of 
7Under the traditional appeal process, formal appeals of forest plans are sent to the 
Washington Office for processing and review. At the time of the revision of the appeal 
regulation, the Forest Service was plagued by a growing backlog of unresolved appeals. It 
was taking too long in terms of calendar days to get a decision on an appeal. In fact, during 
the review of the appeal regulation, the agency was criticized by the public for failing to 
meet its own timelines, although they insisted that appellants meet the timelines outlined in 
the appeal regulation. 
EDR. Successful institutionalization of EDR will require more than encouragement and 
explicit authority to use negotiations through codified regulation. Other vital organizational 
transformations will have to take place to accommodate the demands of EDR approaches and 
the needs of individuals who use these conflict management tools. 
For example, work loads may have to be adjusted; in establishing resource targets, 
top level officials will need to factor in calculations of the time -- in terms of actual 
manhours -- that it takes to build consensus with forest users. Several informants expressed 
frustration that they are expected to do everything they always have done, including meeting 
their resource targets, while also using their time to build consensus with forest user groups. 
Organizational reward structures also may need to be modified; according to some agency 
officials, existing incentive systems are designed primarily to reward meeting deadlines and 
targets rather than successfully resolving issues. However, enduring institutionalization of 
EDR will require that agency officials who utilize EDR approaches be recognized and 
formally rewarded for their conflict management efforts and expertise. Explicit recognition 
for conflict management skills can help to mitigate the differential costs of EDR approaches 
born by only some members of the organization. 
Finally, for successful institutionalization of EDR to occur, organizational changes 
cannot be superficial. The culture of the organization needs to accommodate and truly 
legitimize this more participative management style. In particular, the organization needs to 
develop an organizational culture that supports working with the public in EDR processes. 
The Forest Service, like many natural resource agencies, is undergoing a cultural transition. 
The stated mission of the agency is "Caring for the Land and Serving the People." 
However, the role of Forest Service professionals in "Serving the People" is changing. 
"Serving the People" once meant making professional resource management decisions for the 
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public. As professional land managers, Forest Service officials knew what was best for the 
land and decided what was in the public interest. Increasingly, "Serving the People" is 
coming to mean making decisions with the public. In other words, members of the public, 
rather than the Forest Service, decide what is in their interest. Making decisions with the 
public implies that agency officials apply their scientific, technical expertise to achieve 
socially defined land management objectives. 
Organization culture, definitions of appropriate professional role behavior, and the 
attitudes of organizational members go hand-in-hand and reinforce one another. Those who 
believe that their primary professional purpose and the corresponding mission of the 
organization is to make decisions for the public are not likely to see the benefits of EDR. 
From this standpoint, with primary allegiance to norms and practices of the professional peer 
group, negotiating and accommodating the wishes of stakeholders can be seen as a weakness. 
Conversely, those who have redefined their professional role in terms of making decisions 
with the public -- those who are comfortable utilizing their expertise to meet the needs and 
desires of their clients, the public -- recognize the advantages of EDR approaches. Thus, 
changing notions of appropriate professional role behavior, accepted by individuals and 
embodied in the organizational culture, will facilitate the enduring institutionalization of 
EDR. 
Conclusion 
To summarize, the successful institutionalization of EDR within large public resource 
agencies requires several important ingredients. First, effective boundary spanning is critical 
to enable organizational members to understand the realities of their organizational 
environment, their realistic alternatives to negotiation, and the benefits of EDR. Without this 
critical awareness, organizational members may reject potentially valuable conflict 
management tools. 
Second, an organization trying to institutionalize EDR should actively seek means to 
diffuse knowledge of the realities of EDR within the organization. Evidence suggests that 
diffusion of knowledge is hampered by strategic considerations and the difficulty of replacing 
experiential learning. Nevertheless, it is crucial that organizational mechanisms be devised 
to facilitate the sharing of success stories with EDR as well as thoughtful discussions of the 
disadvantages and limitations of EDR. 
Finally, successful institutionalization of EDR within organizations requires that 
differential organizational and individual perspectives and costs be reconciled and mitigated 
through formal organizational change. It may be necessary to adapt formal organizational 
policies and reward systems to the realities of EDR in order to mitigate the differential costs 
that could discourage individuals from utilizing EDR approaches. However, such 
organizational changes cannot be superficial. The enduring institutionalization of EDR 
requires organizational cultural underpinnings that truly legitimize and support the use of 
EDR. The critical factor for successful institutionalization is that the culture of the 
organization legitimizes the practice of making decisions in partnership with public 
stakeholders. 
The foregoing suggests that the successful institutionalization of EDR may require a 
re-examination of the role of public officials. Traditional assumptions that a group of 
professional experts can determine the public interest must give way to a newer view of the 
appropriate role for public officials that emphasizes the manager as facilitator. Writing about 
the Forest Service in particular, Behan (1966) thoughtfully observed, 
And so American forestry began, presuming an expertise and a righteousness 
that were momentarily popular but not altogether consistent with American 
politics and society . . . For the "various ends of society," in our unique 
society, are and will be set only by that society, and not by a professional 
class of foresters. 
The successful institutionalization of EDR within public agencies will necessitate the adoption 
of a role for public officials that enables them to utilize their professional expertise to 
facilitate the accomplishment of the "various ends of society," determined by members of the 
public in partnership with public officials. 
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